Fourteen months after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria’s energy sector remains the single largest constraint on post-conflict recovery—and the single strongest predictor of where displaced populations are returning. The grid delivered barely two hours of power per day in December 2024. By February 2026, a combination of international gas deals, dam transfers, and sanctions relief has pushed supply to approximately eight hours in served areas. But the gap remains vast: actual generation sits around 2,200 MW against peak demand exceeding 5,600 MW.
This deep dive cross-references energy infrastructure data—power plant output, gas supply, oil production, satellite nighttime lights—with UNHCR displacement and return figures to surface a structural pattern: people return to where the lights are on. Aleppo, Hama, and Homs—the three governorates with direct international gas supply—absorb 70% of all IDP returns. Conversely, the northeast’s oil-rich regions, which produce the majority of Syria’s crude but lack grid-connected generation, show the weakest recovery.
The policy implication is direct: energy infrastructure investment is not merely a recovery-sector issue—it is a displacement driver. Energy-blind humanitarian planning risks misallocating resources away from the areas where returnees are actually arriving and where service demand is surging.
A Shattered Grid: Pre-War vs. Today
Before 2011, Syria’s full installed capacity stood at roughly 9,000 MW, with effective generation capacity of approximately 5,800 MW. Annual generation reached 49,000 GWh, and per capita consumption was approximately 1,611 kWh/year. By 2023, generation had collapsed to 12,900 GWh—a 74% decline. Only about 2,000 MW was operational by late 2024, falling further to an estimated 1,200–1,500 MW at the start of 2025. Over 30% of generated electricity is lost in the network, nearly double the 17% reported in 2010.
Syria entered the conflict with 14 major thermal plants and three Euphrates dams. Four plants were destroyed (2015–2017), representing roughly 18% of pre-war capacity. The eight surviving thermal plants run at 20–50% of nameplate due to fuel shortages. The Euphrates dams—Tabqa (880 MW), Tishrin (630 MW), and Baath (81 MW)—output just 400–500 MW. Both Tabqa and Tishrin were transferred to state control under the January 2026 14-point agreement between Damascus and the SDF, returning Syria’s largest infrastructure assets to central governance for the first time since 2012.
The Fuel Equation
Fuel shortages—not capacity—are the binding constraint. Daily power plant needs require 23 mcm/d of gas plus 5,000 tonnes of fuel oil. As of July 2024, domestic gas production was just 6.5 mcm/d; by early 2026 it has recovered to an estimated 7.6 mcm/d (SPC, via Enab Baladi). Three international gas agreements aim to close the gap: Qatar via Jordan (~2 mcm/d since March 2025), SOCAR via Kilis–Aleppo (~3.3 mcm/d since August 2025), and a Turkish pledge of 5.5–6 mcm/d whose delivery remains uncertain. Total available supply stands at approximately 15.5 mcm/d—67% of daily requirements.
The Conoco/Tabiyeh gas plant east of Deir ez-Zor—pre-war capacity 13 mcm/d—could close more than half the remaining gap if restored. The SPC signed an MoU with ConocoPhillips and Novaterra in November 2025. Syria’s energy minister has targeted 15 mcm/d domestic production by end of 2026.
Extraction Without Electrification
Pre-war crude oil production was approximately 383,000 bpd. By late 2024, production was roughly 60,000 bpd. It recovered to about 120,000 bpd in late 2025 before softening as the Rmelan field declined—SDF officials confirmed in February 2026 that hundreds of wells remain offline due to conflict damage and lack of extraction technology. The SPC now controls al-Omar field (production at ~26,000 bpd and potentially rising to 45,000 bpd after maintenance) following a January 2026 transfer. Syria’s first oil export in 14 years—600,000 barrels—shipped in September 2025.
Refining is the bottleneck. Baniyas (~130K design, ~95K actual) and Homs (~110K design, ~38K actual) are the only operational refineries. Combined throughput covers roughly 60% of domestic fuel demand. Eastern oil fields produce crude that is either exported or piped west—delivering zero local electricity to the communities living above the oil.
Lights in the Dark
Satellite nighttime light (NTL) reflectance is the best available proxy for electricity consumption at community level. Analysis from CA-SYR (Uneven Currents, September 2025) and Karam Shaar Advisory / Syria From Above (February 2026) reveals a stark geographic divide. 76% of locations show recovery, but the median gain in government-transitioned cities (+36.2%) was 66% higher than in SDF-controlled areas (+21.8%).
Aleppo leads nationally at +61%—the only city receiving dedicated international gas supply. Sweida collapsed to −32% following July 2025 security clashes. Grid-connected communities recovered 14–19% faster than generator-dependent ones, confirming that centralised electricity provision, not private generators, drives measurable recovery.
The Energy–Population Nexus
Since December 2024, approximately 1.9 million IDPs have returned to their areas of origin (UNHCR Flash #53, November 2025: 1,944,762; UNHCR confirmed “over 1.9 million” in December 2025). Over 1.07 million refugees have crossed back from Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt (IOM DTM, December 2025); UNHCR’s higher estimate reaches 1.2 million. Yet an estimated 7.2 million remain internally displaced (PRISM, January 2026). New displacement continues: January 2026 government–SDF tensions displaced an estimated 170,000+ people in northeastern Syria.
Cross-referencing UNHCR return data with NTL recovery and energy facility locations reveals the core finding of this analysis: returnees concentrate in governorates with active electricity generation. Aleppo, Hama, and Homs—the three governorates with direct international gas supply—absorb 70% of all IDP returns (40% + 16% + 14%; UNHCR Flash #53). For refugee returnees, the top five destinations—Damascus (17%), Aleppo (16%), Idleb (14%), Homs (13%), and Rural Damascus (12%)—account for 72% (UNHCR Flash #47).
The timing reinforces this link. The sharpest acceleration in return movements (January–August 2025: ~683K to ~1.6M IDP returnees) coincided with the activation of the SOCAR gas pipeline to Aleppo (August 2025) and the beginning of Qatari gas via Jordan (March 2025). Both events pushed electricity supply from 2–3 to approximately 8 hours daily—a threshold UNHCR monitoring identifies as critical for service restoration and the basic conditions of return.
Boundaries: OCHA COD-AB (data.humdata.org). Hover for detail, click to pin. Toggle layers below.
Observed Correlations
Governorate Correlation Matrix
| Governorate | IDP Stock | IDP Ret. Share | Refugee Ret. Share | NTL Change | Key Energy Asset |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aleppo | 22.6% | 40% | 16% | +61% | SOCAR gas ~3.3 mcm/d + Thermal 456 MW |
| Hama | 3.8% | 16% | — | +40% | Mehardeh 655 MW |
| Homs | 5.4% | 14% | 13% | +36% | Jandar 1,183 MW + Ebla gas hub |
| Idleb | 30.1% | 14% | 14% | +30% | Zayzoun destroyed; UCC 1 GW planned |
| Damascus | 2.5% | — | 17% | +17% | Deir Ali 1,500 MW + Al-Nasiriyah 488 MW |
| Raqqa | 3.0% | — | — | +28% | Tabqa Dam 880 MW (transferred Jan 2026) |
| Deir ez-Zor | 2.9% | — | — | +25% | Al-Omar oil + Conoco gas (non-op.) |
| Hasakeh | 8.5% | — | — | −3% | Rmelan oil (SDF admin., declining) |
| Sweida | 0.9% | — | — | −32% | None; Jul 2025 security crisis |
Deals on the Table
Sanctions relief has unlocked a cascade of energy investment. The EU suspended restrictions in February 2025 and fully lifted them in May. The US issued General Licenses GL24/GL25 and repealed the Caesar Act in December 2025. SWIFT transfers resumed mid-2025. The flagship deal is a $7 billion UCC/Qatar consortium covering 5,000 MW of new plants (4 CCGT + 4 solar).
Other key commitments: a $146M World Bank grant (June 2025), $150M in Saudi energy deals (including contracts with ADES Holding and Arabian Drilling), a 1.65M barrel Saudi oil grant that restarted Baniyas refinery, and a new tariff structure (600–1,800 SYP/kWh) reducing the ~$1B/year subsidy burden. The energy minister estimates $40 billion needed for full recovery.
Energy Sector Timeline: Dec 2024 – Feb 2026
Facility-Level Energy Map
This interactive dashboard maps every major energy facility in Syria—power plants, dams, oil fields, gas processing plants, and refineries—with current operational status. Click any tab to switch layers, click markers on the map or rows in the list to view facility details. All data cross-referenced from multiple sources as of February 2026.