⚠ Situation Update — 28 February 2026United States & Israel Launch Joint Military Operations on Iran. Explosions reported in Tehran, Qom, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Karaj and Ilam Province. Iran’s airspace has been closed; Iraq, Israel, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan airspaces also shut. A near-total internet blackout is confirmed at 4% of normal connectivity (NetBlocks). Iran has launched retaliatory ballistic missiles and drones toward Israel and U.S. military installations in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and UAE. Civilian populations across affected areas face immediate protection risks. All data reflects the latest available information at the time of publication and should be treated as estimates subject to rapid change.
Data & Methodology Note: All figures are estimates based on the best available information as of the date shown, sourced from UN agencies (UNHCR, OCHA), government authorities, monitoring organisations (NetBlocks, Flightradar24), and verified media reporting. Qualitative scores (e.g., “exit viability,” “conflict proximity”) are analyst-assessed and should be interpreted as indicative. Where figures are contested or unverifiable (e.g., due to internet blackout), this is clearly noted. This analysis does not constitute legal advice regarding asylum, refugee status, or travel decisions.
Executive Summary
From December Protests to Military Escalation
When protests erupted across all 31 of Iran’s provinces on 28 December 2025 — triggered by an economic collapse that has seen the rial lose roughly half its value in 2025 alone and inflation projected above 60% for 2026 — the international community began assessing the protection needs of people in Iran and available exit corridors. Two months later, that question has taken on an entirely different dimension: the United States and Israel have launched joint military operations, and every aerial corridor in or out of Iran has been closed, significantly affecting the civilian population’s ability to move to safety.
This analysis traces the full arc from the December protests through to 28 February 2026, examining Iran’s land, air, rail and maritime crossing infrastructure in its current conflict-disrupted state. It provides a systematic assessment of the migration management frameworks and border policies of each of Iran’s seven neighbouring states — a critical factor for determining how many people from Iran may be able to seek safety, through which corridors, and under what protection frameworks.
Humanitarian Situation Update — Active Conflict
Civilian Movement Infrastructure — Protection Access Dashboard
Land · Air · Rail · Sea · Updated as the situation develops · All figures are estimates
Severity: Lower Medium High/Critical Closed
3 Open
Türkiye crossings (status evolving)
1 Open
Armenia: Agarak/Norduz — 180-day visa-free
Active
Armed group movements across Iraq–Iran crossings
Land Corridor Status: Access to Safety by Neighbouring State — 28 February 2026
Country
Key Crossings
Status
Migration Policy
Severity
Türkiye
Gürbülak/Bazargan · Kapíköy/Razi · Esendere/Serow
⚠ Open with heightened security
Established border management measures in place. Contingency planning active.
Medium — crossing possible; admission not guaranteed
Not directly affected. Türkiye called for ceasefire.
Only viable aerial alternative via Yerevan after overland to Armenia.
Gulf States
✕ CLOSED
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait closed after retaliatory strikes. Qatar Airways grounded.
Hamad Int’l (Doha) unavailable. Kuwait suspended. Rerouting via Indian Ocean.
Jordan
✕ CLOSED
Closed amid regional missile and drone activity.
Flights rerouted south via Egypt or north over Black Sea.
Sources: AP; Reuters; Al Jazeera; Flightradar24; NetBlocks; Gulf News — 28 Feb 2026
Cumulative Impact on Civilian Air Travel: Jan → Feb 28, 2026
January figures from Jan 9–13 suspension wave. February 28 figures reflect today’s military operations.
Civilian Aviation Disruption: Two Crisis Periods Compared
8 Jan
Wave 1 — Protests: NOTAMs A0182/26 & A0180/26. Internet blackout. IKA: 46+ cancellations. Turkish Airlines, Emirates, Etihad, Qatar, flydubai, Lufthansa, Air France all suspend. Partial resumptions by 13 Jan.
28 Feb
Wave 2 — Military operations: CAO.IRI closes all airspace indefinitely. Mobile services cut. Iraq closes airspace simultaneously. Zero commercial traffic visible (Flightradar24).
28 Feb
Rerouting cascade: Airlines forced over Pakistan (adding hours). Red Sea routes face revived Houthi threat. Lufthansa suspended Tel Aviv through 7 March.
Ongoing
Double blackout: Iran’s 4% connectivity means passengers cannot access airline portals, embassy lines, or digital alerts. Now indefinite.
280
Seats per Tehran–Van departure
560/wk
Max weekly outbound capacity
~$27
Ticket price — cheapest legal exit
Unknown
Current service status
Weekly Outbound Capacity by Exit Mode (pre-crisis vs. today)
Air: 61,000/week (IKA normal) vs. 0 today. Land (Türkiye): ~17,500/week vs. restricted. Rail: 560/week max. Sea (Caspian): ~80/week est.
Tehran–Van Railway: Last International Rail Lifeline
Parameter
Detail
Resumed
9 March 2025 (after 5-year COVID suspension)
Operators
RAI (Iran) & TCDD Taşımacılık (Türkiye)
Frequency
Sun & Wed (Tehran); Mon & Thu (Van)
Capacity
280 passengers (7 × 4-berth couchette cars)
Journey time
~22 hours incl. 1–2 hr border processing
Price
~$27/person (cheapest legal international exit)
Border crossing
Kapıköy/Razi — confirmed open 12 Jan; evolving 28 Feb
Today’s status
⚠ Unconfirmed — monitoring border developments
Weekly capacity
560 passengers outbound — less than 0.001% of Iran’s population/week
Sources: Tehran Times; Türkiye Today (Mar 2025); Seat61; U.S. Virtual Embassy Iran
Capacity note: The Tehran–Van train is Iran’s only international passenger rail link and its most affordable exit route. At 560 seats per week, the rail corridor alone cannot serve as a meaningful displacement route at any significant scale.
2.39M
Shahid Rajaee TEUs (2024, +12% YoY)
20%
Global oil transit through Strait of Hormuz
Active
Caspian ferry (Anzali–Astrakhan) — irregular
Iran Port System: Pre-Conflict Baseline (2024 Volumes)
2024 data — pre-conflict baseline. Current status severely disrupted. Sources: Container News; Marine Insight; LogCluster.
Maritime Humanitarian Concerns (28 Feb 2026)
Apr 2025
Shahid Rajaee explosion: 57+ killed, 1,000+ injured. Port vulnerability precedent.
28 Feb
U.S. Fifth Fleet HQ reportedly struck. Persian Gulf shipping lane security implications.
28 Feb
Strait of Hormuz risk elevated. Iranian official: “all U.S. and Israeli assets legitimate targets.” Houthis indicate readiness for Red Sea operations.
28 Feb
Caspian route: Bandar Anzali–Astrakhan ferry — only viable maritime civilian exit. Status unconfirmed.
Ongoing
Oil price spike. Strait closure — even partial — would be a global supply shock.
Maritime Civilian Evacuation Capacity in Conflict Scenario
Sources: Middle East Eye (Jan/Feb 2026); AIDA/ECRE Turkey report 2025; Iranwire; Türkiye Today; AEI; Stimson Center
Türkiye’s Preparedness Scenarios for Iranian Displacement
Displacement scenario estimates based on published analysis. Planning models, not predictions.
Key Government Statements & Border Actions — 2026
Jan 19
Government of Türkiye: Iran should resolve the crisis through its own means. Opposes external intervention.
Jan 27
Government of Türkiye: Opposes foreign intervention. Calls for diplomatic resolution. Offered to host mediation.
Late Jan
Enhanced border management measures confirmed. Additional security along all borders.
25 Feb
Reaffirms border security preparedness and readiness to protect Turkish citizens.
28 Feb
Military operations begin. MoD: “No sign of refugee influx — additional security on all borders. No uncontrolled migration.” Armed Forces “prepared for all possible scenarios.”
180 days
Visa-free stay in Armenia
100s
Iranian families sought safety in Armenia (Jun 2025)
Iran’s Protection Paradox: World’s Largest Host — Now Facing Its Own Crisis
Dimension
Figure
Significance
Forcibly displaced hosted
3.8M people (UNHCR, Jan–Sep 2024)
World’s largest host — now facing displacement pressures
Registered Afghan refugees
~773,000 (Amayesh cards)
Plus 2M+ undocumented — secondary displacement risk
Resettlement needs
Among highest globally
Even before military operations, significant projected needs
Iraqi-Kurdish refugees 1991
1M+
Iran once opened borders at scale — now faces reverse
Population
~93 million
No neighbour can absorb mass displacement
UNHCR quotas 2025
Severely constrained
Global system under significant strain
Reported protest deaths
~3,400+ (IHRNGO/MoH est.)
Figures contested; internet blackout limits documentation
Sources: UNHCR; AEI; Euronews; IHRNGO; NPR; U.S. Government statement
Corridor Analysis — Land
Land Corridors: Access to Safety & Protection Barriers
As the military situation continues to develop, the land corridor picture for people seeking safety is defined by a significant gap between physical infrastructure and accessible protection: the two most accessible exits — Türkiye and Armenia — remain physically open, yet both are operating under conditions that make mass movement deeply difficult. Türkiye has deployed additional security along all borders including Iran and confirmed comprehensive border management measures. Armenia’s Agarak/Norduz crossing remains available, but absorption capacity is negligible for anything beyond small numbers.
Türkiye — 28 February 2026
The Ministry of National Defence confirms “additional security measures have been implemented along all borders including with Iran, and there is no uncontrolled migration.” The Turkish Armed Forces described as “prepared for all possible scenarios.” Türkiye’s legal framework provides non-European asylum seekers with “conditional protection” status under the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (No. 6458, 2014).
The Iraq corridor has been reoriented entirely for military rather than civilian movement. While Iraqi Kurdistan technically offers visa-free entry to Iranian passport holders and hosts UNHCR infrastructure, both the KRI and federal Iraq have been struck by Iranian retaliatory action directed at U.S. military installations. The Shalamcheh and Khosravi crossings — already reportedly used in January to facilitate armed group movements into Iran — are now operational vectors of the wider conflict rather than civilian exit routes.
The aviation disruption that began during the January protest period has escalated to a total closure. CAO.IRI has closed Iranian airspace indefinitely. Iraq has simultaneously closed its airspace — severing the critical Baghdad and Erbil flight information regions. Israeli airspace is shut under a 48-hour state of emergency. The UAE temporarily closed following reports of Iranian missile activity. Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan have also closed amid retaliatory missile activity. In a single morning, at least eight of the most strategically significant airspaces in the Middle East have become inaccessible.
“Civilian air traffic [severely disrupted] after Israel’s strike on Iran, with dozens of civilian aircraft in the air in both Iraq and Iran.”
OSINTtechnical on X/Twitter, 28 February 2026
The compounding factor is the simultaneous internet blackout inside Iran, confirmed at 4% of normal connectivity (NetBlocks). Mobile phone services have also been cut. Passengers cannot access airline portals, embassy emergency lines, or receive digital alerts. Only Yerevan, Armenia offers a viable aerial exit once overland travel to Armenia has been completed.
Corridor Analysis — Rail
Rail Corridors: The Tehran–Van Lifeline
The Tehran–Van railway — resumed March 2025 after five years — remains Iran’s only international passenger rail link. At 560 outbound seats per week maximum, its strategic value as a displacement relief valve is minimal, though individually it represents the cheapest ($27) and most accessible exit for those near Tehran or Tabriz. The border crossing Kapıköy/Razi was confirmed open 12 January; current status requires monitoring. The internet blackout makes booking, border coordination, and passenger information virtually impossible.
Iran’s maritime geography offers one thin lifeline and a cluster of enormous trade vulnerabilities. The Bandar Anzali–Astrakhan Caspian ferry route — irregular, no fixed schedule — is geographically the most insulated from today’s conflict. It connects to Russia, whose Caspian waters remain available. The route is likely to see surging demand.
In the Persian Gulf, the picture is the reverse. Shahid Rajaee Port at Bandar Abbas — handling 85% of Iran’s port throughput and 2.39 million TEUs in 2024 — sits in the strategic shadow of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of global oil supply transits. An Iranian official declared all U.S. and Israeli assets “legitimate targets.” Even partial Strait disruption would be a global supply shock.
The pattern that defined Iran’s crossing infrastructure during January — high cargo capacity coexisting with near-zero civilian movement capacity — has been significantly intensified by today’s military operations. Across all four modalities: air closed entirely; rail at maximum 560 outbound seats with uncertain status; maritime limited to a single irregular Caspian ferry; and land crossings open in two directions only (Türkiye, Armenia), both with limited capacity for large-scale movement.
The protection landscape across Iran’s seven neighbours reveals a system-wide gap. Türkiye has confirmed comprehensive border management measures. Armenia offers temporary shelter but no durable solution. Azerbaijan, Iraq, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan range from restricted to actively dangerous. Meanwhile, the global resettlement system is under severe strain.
Critical Finding
Iran is simultaneously the world’s largest host country for forcibly displaced people (~3.8 million), a country with among the highest projected resettlement needs globally, and — as of today — a country experiencing active military operations whose crossing infrastructure is being progressively closed. The protection and displacement challenges are no longer hypothetical — they are today’s operational reality.